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Abstract 
The new intergovernmentalism seeks to understand the changing dynamics of 
contemporary European integration. It emphasises, inter alia, member states’ 
preference for deliberative modes of decision-making and their reluctance to 
delegate new powers to traditional supranational institutions. The euro crisis is 
sometimes seen as a difficult case for the new intergovernmentalism because of the 
perceived importance of hard bargaining over crisis measures during this episode 
and the new roles entrusted to the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank under crisis reforms. Such criticisms, this paper argues, overlook: the 
importance of high-level consensus-seeking and deliberation in saving the single 
currency; the disparate forms of delegation deployed to preserve member state 
influence over Economic and Monetary Union; and the extent to which the euro crisis 
has amplified the European Union’s political disequilibrium. Far from running counter 
to the new intergovernmentalism, it concludes, the euro crisis exemplifies the 
turbulent dynamics of the post-Maastricht period. 
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The New Intergovernmentalism and the Euro 
Crisis: A Painful Case? 
 
1. Introduction 
European integration theory is forged in crises, and individual theories can be the 
sum of efforts to theorise specific crises. For that reason, new periods of economic 
and political turmoil for the European Union (EU) pose particular challenges for 
existing theoretical approaches, especially if they disrupt what scholars understand 
to be prevailing political dynamics. Crises thus bring intellectual energy, although 
this energy can be misplaced if critics or proponents of particular approaches are too 
quick to abandon or qualify prior theoretical claims. Ernst Haas’s decision to declare 
neo-functionalism obsolescent if not obsolete at a difficult time for the European 
Communities is the most striking example (Haas 1976), albeit one that he (Haas 2004) 
and other scholars working in this theoretical tradition rectified (Niemann and 
Ioannou, 2015; Schmitter 2005; Schmitter and Lefkofridi 2016). Neo-functionalism 
remains important for thinking about contemporary Europe, as do classical and 
liberal strains of intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann 2005; Moravcsik 1998, 2018). Of 
course, no theoretical approach(es) can claim a monopoly on understanding Europe. 
Nor should theoretical innovation be discouraged, especially when the EU, by virtue 
of its longevity, cuts across distinct periods for Europe and, indeed, the international 
system. 
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The new intergovernmentalism treats the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 
as a turning point for European integration (Puetter 2014; Bickerton, Hodson and 
Puetter 2015a, b; Fabbrini and Puetter 2016). Hitherto, when member states extended 
the scope of Community decision-making they did so by delegating new powers to 
the European Commission and Court of Justice. Thereafter, the new 
intergovernmentalism contends, integration intensified without, for the most part, 
delegating new powers to these traditional supranational institutions along 
conventional lines. Traditional theories of integration, while they have much to offer, 
struggle to explain this paradoxical character of post-Maastricht integration. In spite 
of their differences, neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism equate 
integration with the empowerment of traditional supranational institutions (Haas 
1964; Moravcsik 1999). As a consequence, they often downplay the significance of 
integration since the 1990s, a view that rests uneasily with the EU’s dynamism 
during this period. The new intergovermentalism explains this integration paradox 
as a choice by national governments and EU institutions intent on pursuing closer 
cooperation but mindful of the problems of legitimacy and trust facing EU and 
national elites. Such choices also reflect the blurred lines between high and low 
politics such that even the most prosaic areas of policy-making can be significant for 
national sovereignty. 
Institutional choice in the post-Maastricht period is not simply an attempt to reap the 
benefits of cooperation, the new intergovernmentalism argues. Commercial interests 
are balanced by normative concerns. Preference formation is problematic for this 
reason, being underpinned not only by concerns over the EU’s democratic deficit but 
a deeper crisis of representation facing European polities. Deliberation and 
consensus-seeking in bodies such as the Eurogroup and European Council try to 
square this circle by allowing national governments to extend cooperation without 
being seen to cede further sovereignty to the Commission and the Court of Justice. 
Delegation to de novo bodies responds to these tensions in a different way by 
allowing national governments to build shared institutions over which they maintain 
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a high degree of intergovernmental control and without revising EU treaties. The 
traditional supranational institutions, being driven by aims other than the pursuit of 
ever-closer union, are complicit in this institutional dynamic. This contrasts with 
neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, which see the Commission and 
Court of Justice as seeking to ‘upgrade the common interest’ and so win new powers 
for themselves, however much these theories disagree over the ability of such actors 
to achieve this objective (Haas 1964; Burli and Mattli 1993; Moravcsik 1999).  
As with all attempts at theorising European integration, the new 
intergovernmentalism faces criticisms (see Bulmer 2015 and Schimmelfennig 2015a). 
A recurring charge is that this approach cannot account for European integration 
during the euro crisis, which began in late 2009 after Greece, and later other member 
states, found themselves unable to finance their public debt following the global 
financial crisis. 1  Nugent and Rhinard (2016) argue that the Commission’s increased 
importance as a fiscal and financial manager following the euro crisis rests uneasily 
with the new intergovernmentalism, as does the fact that the Commission’s authority 
has, if anything, been strengthened by the creation of de novo bodies (Nugent and 
Rhinard 2016: 1209). Becker, Bauer, Connolly and Kassim (2016) reach a similar 
conclusion. The Commission, they argue, acted as a powerful, if more focused, 
engine of integration during the euro crisis, which broadened and deepened its 
powers over EU economic surveillance. Schimmelfennig (2015a), meanwhile, sees 
member states’ willingness to delegate important new powers over banking 
supervision to the European Central Bank (ECB) as being at odds with new 
intergovernmentalism’s claims about member states’ aversion to supranational 
decision-making. Schmidt (2018) criticises new intergovernmentalism for failing to 
                                                   
1 Scholars agree on the start date for the euro crisis but not on its end date. Jones (2014) treats 
2012 as a terminal point, reflecting the ECB’s decision to engage in large-scale bond 
purchases, but this was three years before a standoff between Greece’s government and its 
international creditors triggered a period of intense turmoil for the single currency. Greece 
exited its financial assistance programme in August 2018, the last eurozone member to do so, 
although tensions between Italy and the European Commission later that year raised 
concerns that the euro crisis might not be over. 
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make explicit the power dynamics in euro crisis deliberation and decision-making. 
Germany did not impose solutions on Greece and other member states in the crisis, 
she suggests, but the German government entered deliberations with ‘outsize 
power’, which it was not afraid to use (Schmidt 2018: 6).  
These criticisms provide an opportunity to clarify and refine the new 
intergovernmentalism. Far from being a difficult case, this paper argues, the euro 
crisis chimes with new intergovernmentalism’s key claims. First, the crisis illustrates 
the problems of preference formation in the post-Maastricht period, with 
governments’ responses to the single currency’s problems informed not only by 
commercial interests but also by Europe’s legitimacy crisis. Second, member states’ 
institutional choices during the euro crisis exemplify the importance of deliberation 
and consensus-seeking through bodies such as the European Council and Euro 
Summit and their preference for empowering de novo bodies. European Banking 
Union, it notes, is far from being a straightforward example of delegation to 
supranational institutions. Third, the crisis confirms the Commission’s ambivalence 
about ever closer union, most noticeably under the presidency of José Manuel 
Barroso but also, in a more complex way, under that of Jean-Claude Juncker. Finally, 
member states may have saved the euro but they did so by aggravating rather than 
alleviating the political disequilibrium facing the EU.  
2. Problems of Preference Formation 
The new intergovernmentalism takes as its starting point the fact that political 
contestation around European integration emerged as an element in the constitution 
of national preferences in the post-Maastricht period. This contrasts with liberal 
intergovernmentalism, which rests on a ‘societal’ model of preference formation that 
places particular emphasis on commercial interests, especially the economic interests 
of powerful producer groups and, secondarily, the macroeconomic preferences of 
governing coalitions (Moravcsik 1998: 3). Commercial interests matter for new 
intergovernmentalism but they interact in often unpredictable and indeterminate 
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ways with normative concerns, including, in particular, a distrust of national elites 
and a widespread disenchantment with the process of political representation. 
Concerns about legitimacy, felt by national governments as well as by EU 
institutions, have thus become part of preference formation. 
Schimmelfennig (2015b) sees the euro crisis as a fairly straightforward example of 
preference formation à la liberal intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik (1993: 493-4) 
views macroeconomic policy as being subject to diffuse societal preferences because 
this domain of decision-making is largely concerned with the provision of public 
goods. Schimmelfennig sees the euro crisis as a special case because financial turmoil 
and policy responses to it had direct implications for financial institutions, with the 
result that producer groups had less diffuse preferences than usual in this policy 
domain (Schimmelfennig 2015b: 180). Member state governments also had a shared 
interest in saving the euro, Schimmelfennig (2015b: 181) argues, because the 
dissolution of the eurozone would have been costly for all concerned. Where 
member states disagreed, he suggests, was over the question of whether the costs of 
crisis management should be borne collectively or nationally, with such differences 
rooted once again in socio-economic considerations: northern member states with 
strong fiscal positions favoured the second of these options while southern member 
states facing insolvency or the risk thereof favoured the first. This view of the euro 
crisis broadly chimes with Moravcsik (2012), who sees member states as defending 
the euro, if only because the short-term costs of dissolving the single currency would 
be so great.   
This account of preference formation in the euro crisis is compelling but it arguably 
overstates the extent to which societal preferences were united behind saving the 
single currency through deeper integration while underplaying the impact of public 
opinion and party politics on member state governments. Northern European banks, 
as both Moravcsik (2012) and Schimmelfennig (2015b) observe, were heavily exposed 
at the start of the crisis to sovereign debt issued by the eurozone’s so-called 
vulnerable periphery, helping to explain the former’s desire to see governments 
The New Intergovernmentalism and the Euro Crisis 
 6 
provide financial assistance to the former. Banks soon reduced their exposure, 
however, and with this modified their view on the euro crisis. That the combined 
exposure of France and Germany to the eurozone periphery fell from $1.9 trillion in 
2008 to $800 billion in 2012 (Minenna 2018) helps explain why economic interest 
groups became more relaxed about the idea that the eurozone, in its existing form, 
might not survive. Five years after the Institute of International Finance campaigned 
actively for financial assistance to Greece (Kalaitzake 2017), this powerful industry 
group was sanguine, in 2015, about the prospects for Grexit (Atkins and Slater 2015). 
Less than half of business leaders in the eurozone surveyed in 2015 thought that 
Grexit would be harmful to the euro (Grant Thornton 2015: 8).  
Producer groups ultimately supported efforts to save the single currency during the 
euro crisis but they were not uniformly in favour of more Europe. A survey of 
eurozone business leaders in 2013 showed that 66% favoured deeper economic 
integration compared to 40% for deeper political integration (Grant Thornton 2013). 
It also revealed significantly higher support for political integration among German 
business leaders (61%) compared to their French counterparts (35%). In Germany, 
large commercial banks favoured a greater role for the EU in financial supervision 
but the country’s savings and cooperative banks pushed back (Hennessy 2014). 
Elsewhere in the eurozone, interest groups were largely disinterested in reforms over 
the European Stability Mechanism (Bojovic, Munta and Puetter 2018).  
If the interests of producer groups over the euro crisis were more diffuse than they 
looked, so too were the macroeconomic preferences of governing coalitions. For 
highly-indebted countries, euro exit would almost certainly have been turbulent; 
however, it would have brought degrees of policy freedom in the short term that 
member states lacked by staying in the eurozone, including currency devaluation, an 
escape from a debt-deflation trap and a more straightforward route to debt 
restructuring (Papanikos 2015). For surplus countries, the dissolution of the eurozone 
provided an opportunity to rebuild the European monetary system around a more 
homogenous and macro-economically like-minded group of member states, as 
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occurred in the 1970s after the Snake in the Tunnel was replaced by a deutschmark 
zone. It also offered an escape from the unconventional and potentially inflationary 
crisis policies of the ECB. Members of the governing coalition in Greece and 
Germany were drawn in different ways to these arguments. Yanis Varoufakis 
consistently denies that he supported a return to the drachma during his brief tenure 
as Greek finance minister but he reportedly commissioned work on a parallel 
currency and suggested that some cabinet colleagues favoured Grexit (Smith 2015). 
Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance minister and a longstanding advocate of core 
Europe, argued strongly that Greece be offered a ‘timeout’ from the eurozone and, in 
July 2015, convinced finance ministers to put this option to the European Council 
(Karnitschnig 2015). That the heads of state of government stood by the single 
currency was not just because its dissolution would have been economically 
disruptive but also because of their political commitment to European economic 
cooperation, argues Barry Eichengreen (2010). 
The most clear-cut constraint on member state governments during the euro crisis 
came not from pressure groups or governing coalitions but from public opinion and 
party politics. Public support of the ECB plummeted during the euro crisis (Roth, 
Jonung and Nowak-Lehmann 2016), as it did more generally in political institutions 
(Foster and Frieden 2017). In April 2007, 58% of EU citizens said that they tended to 
trust the EU (source: Eurobarometer Interactive). By November 2013, this figure had 
fallen to 31%. The percentage of respondents expressing trust in national government 
fell from 43% to 23% over the same period. ‘Europeans should trust in the essentially 
democratic nature of the EU, which will encourage them to distribute the costs of 
convergence more fairly within and among countries’, argued Moravcsik (2012: 55). 
Many Europeans, it would seem, were otherwise inclined.  
Governing parties that mismanage the economy stand a higher chance of losing 
office but the electoral backlash that followed the euro crisis went beyond this effect. 
Voters not only punished incumbents, Hobolt and Tilley (2016) observe. All 
mainstream parties saw their combined vote share decline from 86% in 2004 to 72% 
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in 2015. The challenger parties that benefitted from this opportunity were not all 
Eurosceptic, Greece’s Syriza being a case in point. However, a core of anti-euro 
parties rode this political wave, including the True Finns, the Party for Freedom, 
Rassemblement national, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), the League and the Five 
Star Movement. Such challengers shared not only an aversion to deeper eurozone 
integration but also a desire for a referendum on either eurozone or EU membership. 
Although mainstream parties resisted such pledges they became increasingly 
cautious about eurozone reforms that might trigger significant EU treaty 
amendments and so add to pressure for a public vote. Treaty change was taboo 
under the Hollande administration, admitted its former economics minister 
Emmanuel Macron (Gotev 2017).   
Faced with these legitimation challenges, member state governments sought to save 
the euro while avoiding the delegation of significant new policy-making powers to 
EU institutions where possible. Governments, as the democratically elected 
representatives of sovereign states, play a powerful role in legitimating EU decision-
making in liberal intergovernmentalism. New intergovernmentalism instead sees 
governments as acutely aware of their own problems of representation and it was 
such concerns, which help to explain preference formation in the euro crisis. Reforms 
in response to this crisis were more consistent with the second of these views; 
existing treaty provisions were used and stretched where possible, with member 
states seeking more ambitious changes through international law treaties from which 
EU institutions were kept at arm’s length and which could enter into force without 
the approval of all member states (Hodson and Maher 2018: Chapter 8). The revision 
of Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union was an 
exception undertaken only when a challenge to the European Stability Mechanism in 
national higher courts seemed inevitable and only then under the Treaty’s Simplified 
Revision Procedure, thus minimising the scope for a public vote in member states 
such as Ireland.  
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3. A Crisis of Consensus-Seeking and Deliberation 
A defining feature of the post-Maastricht period, the new intergovernmentalism 
contends, is how consensus-seeking and deliberation have become guiding norms in 
day-to-day decision-making. Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter (2015a) see consensus as 
an end in itself driven by member states’ determination to reach agreement on 
shared policy challenges. Threats of vetoes or exit are anathema to this working 
method, as is settling for prolonged stalemate. New intergovernmentalism 
understands deliberation, meanwhile, as member states’ attempt to work through 
national differences on contentious matters and at the very highest levels of EU 
policy-making. Liberal intergovernmentalism does not overlook such norms but it 
has different understandings of – and expectations about – them. For Moravcsik 
(2018: 1657) member states frequently resort to consensus to oil the wheels of 
intergovernmental bargaining, for example, by offering opt-outs and concessions to 
recalcitrant states. He sees deliberation as a more infrequent attempt to transform 
identities and preferences through argumentation, which lends itself to low-stakes or 
high-consensus issues. 
The rise of the Eurogroup and European Council in the post-Maastricht period 
reflects these new intergovernmental dynamics. At the time of the single currency’s 
launch, eurozone members sought to coordinate economic policies and yet remained 
reluctant to cede further sovereignty in this sphere. The Eurogroup squared this 
circle by providing a forum in which eurozone finance ministers could engage in 
informal dialogue and deliberation outside the strictures of the ECOFIN Council. A 
broad convergence in economic ideas between finance ministers made such 
cooperation possible, if far from plain sailing. Similar dynamics can be seen in the 
hands-on role assumed by the European Council in the Lisbon Strategy’s economic 
reform agenda and in formulating collective responses to the global financial crisis. 
In both cases, heads of state or government went well beyond the European 
Council’s traditional role in providing overall direction to the EU to puzzle over 
complex policy problems.  
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The euro crisis was a high-stakes affair that saw no shortage of hard bargaining or 
power politics. Germany has rarely appeared more dominant in EU decision-making 
(Bulmer 2014) and even smaller member states fought hard to protect their interests, 
as in Finland’s demand for collateral in negotiations over financial assistance 
programmes (Moulds 2012). The Euro Summit’s treatment of Greece in the summer 
of 2015, moreover, stretched the idea of consensus-seeking to its limits. Having tried 
but failed to seek more favourable terms with its creditors in spite of domestic 
backing in an anti-austerity referendum, the government of Alexis Tspiras 
reluctantly accepted even harsher conditions in return for a third financial assistance 
programme. While the Greek Prime Minister and the German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel thrashed out the terms of this deal, the hashtag #ThisIsACoup trended on 
Twitter.  
At the same time, it is hard to imagine how the euro would have survived had hard 
bargaining alone been employed. Heads of state or government remained steadfast 
in their commitment to the single currency not because the breakup of the eurozone 
would have been costly but in spite of the short-term incentives that some faced to 
return to national currencies. Although she faced a degree of domestic pressure for 
Grexit, including from her own finance minister, Merkel sought to avoid this 
scenario at all costs. ‘If the euro collapses then Europe and the idea of European 
union will fail’, she told an audience in Aachen in May 2010 (Irish Times 2010). Even 
Tspiras, for all his radicalism, resisted a return to the drachma. His position was not 
one of Euroscepticism but anti-globalisation, which explains his concerted efforts to 
remove the IMF from the Troika even though the Fund cut a less hawkish figure than 
the Commission at times. In the most comprehensive study of euro crisis negotiation 
to date, Lundgren, Bailer and Dellmuth (2019) find that power resources cannot 
explain negotiating outcomes. Commitment to economic and financial integration 
and the dynamics of compromise and reciprocity offer more powerful explanations, 
they find, marking the EU out from other international organisations. 
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Threats of vetoes or exit were exceptional during the euro crisis and ran contrary to 
the EU’s approach to the crisis, as both George Papandreou and David Cameron 
discovered. The former broke from the EU’s consensus-seeking norms by 
announcing a referendum on the terms of financial assistance from the EU and IMF. 
Within a week, Papandreou had called off this referendum amid fierce opposition at 
home and from EU partners. Within a fortnight, he had resigned as Prime Minister. 
Having refused to support plans for an EU treaty amendment on euro crisis reforms, 
the British Prime Minister Cameron found himself isolated after all other member 
states except the Czech Republic pressed ahead with plans for an international law 
treaty, the Fiscal Compact. Alexis Tspiras’s anti-austerity referendum in June 2015 
was a largely symbolic affair. After Greek voters resoundingly rejected the 
conditions sought by the EU and IMF in an earlier, abandoned round of negotiations, 
the Greek Prime Minister fired his finance minister and prepared to strike a deal to 
keep his country in the eurozone.  
The euro crisis was not just a political one for the EU but an ideational one, which 
exposed the limits of the prevailing policy paradigm and reignited divisions between 
Keynesian and ordoliberal traditions. Whereas France, a traditional torchbearer for 
Keynesianism, was an early advocate for fiscal stimulus and financial assistance, 
Germany, in true ordoliberal fashion, preached balanced budgets and the dangers of 
moral hazard (Bohn and De Jong 2011). And yet, the deliberative modes employed 
by member states proved sufficient to work through such differences. Had the 
Merkel administration been as entrenched in its ordo-liberal thinking as some 
suggested, then it would not have accepted the degree of flexibility permitted in the 
design and implementation of the six pack and Fiscal Compact. Nor would it have 
tolerated the ECB’s bond buying programme, financed the lion’s share of loans to 
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain or accepted the decision in June 2018 to 
provide debt relief to Greece. Van Esch’s (2014) cognitive mapping of key speeches 
by eurozone leaders during the crisis contrasts the ideational flexibility shown by the 
German Chancellor with the more rigidly ordoliberal views of Bundesbank president 
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Axel Weber. Merkel’s refusal to back Weber for the post of ECB president and the 
latter’s resignation from the Bundesbank before his term of office expired come as 
little surprise in the light of such findings. 
Member states’ commitment to consensus-seeking and deliberation during the euro 
crisis found voice in the Eurogroup and when this forum struggled to find a way 
forward, the Euro Summit. The latter embodied a new intergovernmental logic by 
bringing together eurozone heads of state or government for closed-doors 
discussions on the most vexing aspects of crisis management (Puetter 2016). Its 
impact was almost instantaneous. At their first meeting in February 2010, eurozone 
leaders bridged national differences over IMF involvement in the unfolding 
sovereign debt crisis and agreed to dispatch the Troika to Athens. An agreement, in 
principle, on financial support for Greece came a month later. Decisive too was the 
Euro Summit’s all-night talks in July 2015 on a third financial assistance package for 
Greece. When talks threatened to break down before dawn, European Council 
President Donald Tusk reportedly told Merkel and Tsipras: ‘I’m sorry, there is no 
way you are leaving this room’ (Chassany et al., 2015), encapsulating in one phrase 
the deliberative dynamics of new intergovernmentalism.  
EU heads of state or government played a central role too in the reform agenda 
initiated by the euro crisis. The creation of a European Council working group on 
output gaps illustrated the blurred dividing line between high and low politics post-
Maastricht, with technical discussions over this macroeconomic indicator deemed 
sufficiently political to include representatives of the heads of state or government. 
More generally, the European Council and Euro Summit played a detailed and 
prominent role in reform debates. In March 2010, Herman Van Rompuy, the first 
full-time President of the European Council, was appointed head of a taskforce to 
explore options for reforming the EU’s fiscal rules and crisis resolution framework. 
In June 2012, Van Rompuy was invited to develop proposals for the achievement of a 
‘genuine EMU’ in close collaboration with the presidents of the European 
Commission, ECB and Eurogroup. That the President of the European Commission 
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was not asked to lead these initiatives showed how the dynamics of European 
integration had shifted since the days of the Delors Report. Jean-Claude Juncker 
would regained some of this initiative when he was entrusted to prepare a follow-up 
report (see below) but the most important and contentious aspects of eurozone 
reform from 2010 onwards were settled by the heads of state or government. 
4. Supranational Preferences 
The euro crisis provides an important test of whether the Commission is hardwired 
for ever closer union, a central, if contested, claim of the new intergovernmentalism. 
The Commission, it should be stressed, is not a languid or declining institution from 
this theoretical vantage point. It is rather an institution that invests its energies into 
projects other than its own empowerment. The new intergovernmentalism thus 
questions the assumption underpinning disparate theories of European integration 
and governance that the Commission is, for reasons of self-interest or ideology, a 
competence maximising institution (see, for example, Pollack 2003; Cooley and 
Spruyt 2009). 
There are two principal reasons for the Commission’s ambivalence about ever-closer 
union post-Maastricht (Hodson 2013). The first sees this institution as a strategic 
actor, which is reluctant to put forward proposals that stand little chance of success. 
The prospects for supranational entrepreneurship in early periods should not be 
exaggerated but member states’ preference for intergovernmental modes of decision-
making and declining popular support for integration since the 1990s explains why 
the Commission has been so cautious about ever-closer union since Maastricht. The 
second sees the Commission as being more than just a competence maximiser. The 
trend towards choosing the President from the ranks of current or recent members of 
the European Council may explain the Commission’s preference for 
intergovernmentalism, as might ideological divergence at the level of Commission 
services (see Kassim et al 2013). The Commission also emerges as a more partisan 
body during this period thanks to the introduction of qualified majority voting for 
The New Intergovernmentalism and the Euro Crisis 
 14 
nominating the Commission President and the end to the practice whereby large 
member states nominated one Commissioner from each of the two main political 
parties (Hix 2008). 
José Manuel Barroso’s cautious response to the euro crisis, and the global financial 
crisis before it, exemplifies this new intergovernmental view of the Commission. 
When Europe’s banking system faced systemic risks in the second half of 2008, 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy saw an opportunity to regulate Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism. The Commission President belatedly spoke out against ‘futile attempts to 
stem financial globalisation’ (European Commission 2008) ‘grand initiatives that 
have no chance of being followed through’ (Barroso 2008). When the euro crisis 
struck, Barroso supported the reform of the stability and growth pact but only after 
member states had agreed to re-open the EU’s fiscal rules. The Commission 
President can claim to have set the agenda over initial attempts to strengthen 
financial supervision, but he followed member states’ lead on European Banking 
Union and the creation of crisis resolution mechanisms.  
Having assigned key economic portfolios to free marketeers during his first term, 
Barroso saw his College of Commissioners pulled in a more interventionist direction 
in this second term. While Internal Market Commissioner Charlie McCreevy had 
showed little appetite for stringent financial regulation even after the global financial 
crisis hit, his successor, Michel Barnier, sponsored a string of reform proposals. 
Having tried but failed to assign Barnier a different brief, the Commission President 
had little choice but to acquiesce. As his term of office drew to a close, Barroso grew 
bolder, mindful perhaps of his legacy. In his State of the Union Speech for 2012, the 
Commission President expressed his support for economic, financial and political 
union. This was not a damascene conversion, however. He used the terms loosely, 
with economic union, for example, evoked in relation to reforms already on the 
agenda rather than any radical transfer of decision-making to the Commission.  
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Jean-Claude Junker is a more complicated case for the new intergovernmentalism 
(see Sanjurjo Hanck 2018). Through the Five Presidents Report, the Commission’s 
White Paper on the Future of Europe and the follow-up reflection paper on 
deepening EMU, Juncker showed dynamism that his predecessor lacked. 
Nevertheless, the reform proposals put forward by the Luxembourg Prime Minister 
remained circumspect about upgrading the common interest. While the Five 
Presidents’ calls for financial, fiscal and political union had a centralising ring, these 
proposals avoided a significant transfer of new policy-making powers to the 
Commission. Indeed, many of its most ambitious ideas concerned the creation or 
reform of de novo bodies such as a common backstop for the Single Resolution Fund, 
a European Fiscal Board and a eurozone treasury.2 The Report’s unease with such 
‘intergovernmental solutions’ is reflected in its calls for the Single Resolution Fund 
and the European Stability Market to be eventually integrated ‘into the framework of 
EU law’ but this ambition was a long-range one at best (Juncker 2015). The Five 
Presidents in general – as well as Juncker, in particular – had good reasons not to 
trigger major treaty amendments at this time, not least because of UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron’s determination to link eurozone reforms to a British referendum on 
continued membership.  
The Juncker Commission’s hesitancy about ever-closer union was clearer still from 
its White Paper on the Future of Europe, which explored five alternative scenarios 
for how the EU might evolve by 2025 (European Commission 2017a). Only two of 
these involved deeper integration among some or all member states, the others 
considered the status quo or a narrowing of the EU’s activities. Far from an act of 
entrepreneurship by Juncker, the White Paper was, as one commentator put it, 
‘intended to throw the ball back to member states to decide on the path of 
integration, after several backlashes against his initiatives to move integration 
forward’ (Morrilas 2017). That Jean-Claude Juncker presented his own ‘sixth 
                                                   
2 The report made the case for a eurozone stabilisation instrument but remained vague about 
how it would work or where it would be situated in the EU’s institutional architecture. 
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scenario’ just six months later suggested that his administration was divided on this 
approach. And yet, Juncker’s scenario brought little clarity to this exercise, especially 
in relation to EMU. Aside from proposing a euro-accession instrument to provide 
technical and, perhaps, financial assistance to member states seeking to join the 
eurozone, the Commission President provided little more than a general declaration 
of ‘European’ values and an implicit rebuke to Emmanuel Macron’s plans for a 
multi-speed Europe (Juncker 2017: 5-6). Ultimately, the Juncker administration was 
at pains to let member states lead on such reform debates rather than being seen to 
impose its ideas from above (Russack 2017: 7). The Commission’s accompanying 
reflection paper also avoided championing a bigger role for itself in relation to 
eurozone governance (European Commission 2017b). One exception concerned the 
report’s insistence that any eurozone stabilisation mechanism be embedded within 
the EU’s multiannual financial framework, thus ensuring Commission involvement 
in the governance of such a mechanism. Other proposals clipped the Commission’s 
wings, as in the idea of putting the Commission’s economic surveillance tasks under 
the control of a new EU finance minister, who would sit within the Commission and 
the Council of the EU.  
The real puzzle from a new intergovernmentalist perspective is not why Juncker 
rekindled the pursuit of ever-closer union – he didn’t for the reasons set out above – 
but why he was more willing than Barroso to lead reform debates. One explanation 
is that he was given licence to do so by member states, who were content, for 
example, to let the Commission President rather than the European Council 
President Donald Tusk take charge of the Five Presidents Report. Tusk was not only 
less experienced; he came from a member state that showed no appetite for joining 
the eurozone. But member states’ enthusiasm for far-reaching reforms should not be 
exaggerated. Their reaction to this report and the Commission’s White Paper were 
predictably lukewarm.  
It is not only the Commission that is ambivalent about ever-closer union, the new 
intergovernmentalism suggests, but also the Court of Justice of the EU. Through its 
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post-Maastricht case law, Marie-Pierre Granger (2015: 209) suggests, the Court is 
‘generally deferential towards intergovernmental coordination or decision-making 
processes, and is much less inclined to push for supranational mechanisms at all 
costs’. This tendency was certainly discernable when the Court was drawn into the 
euro crisis. In Pringle, the Court rejected arguments by an Irish parliamentarian 
before the Irish Supreme Court that the ESM Treaty was unlawful, thus ensuring that 
the financial assistance granted by the EU to eurozone members could continue. In 
Gauweiler, the Court ruled that the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
was permissible under the EU treaties following a challenge before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. Through these rulings, the Court ensured that policy 
responses to the euro crisis could continue. Had it ruled otherwise, crisis 
management would have been greatly – perhaps prohibitively – complicated. In 
neither case, however, did the Court advance a supranational vision of integration. 
In Pringle, indeed, the Court took a pragmatic view of intergovernmental decision-
making (Borger 2013). Member states were free to establish the ESM outside the 
scope of EU law, it ruled, on the understanding that the commitments undertaken by 
member states are compatible with EU law.3 Member states could also, it decided, 
entrust tasks to EU institutions outside the framework of the EU – as occurred with 
the ECB and the Commission in relation to the ESM – so long as such tasks did not 
encroach on areas in which the EU enjoys exclusive competence or alter the powers 
conferred on these institutions under the treaties.4 
5. Delegation and De Novo Bodies 
The new intergovernmentalism does not see the Commission as being in decline 
post-Maastricht (Peterson 2015). It accepts, for one thing, that this institution retains 
the significant policy-making powers it acquired in the pre-Maastricht period in 
areas such as competition and external trade policy. Furthermore, as discussed 
                                                   
3 Pringle v Government of Ireland (2012) C-370/12, para. 109 
4 Pringle, para. 158 
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above, the Commission is not necessarily seeking to extend its own powers. What 
constitutes a ‘win’ for the Commission is consequently changing over time. It may 
prefer to consolidate its existing competences, pursue partisan political objectives or 
avoid prominent roles in contentious policy areas given its own problems of 
legitimacy and those facing the EU. Or it may prefer the empowerment of de novo 
bodies to the status quo of no delegation or simply be resigned to its fate.  
Bauer and Becker (2014) are right to see the Commission’s new role in crisis 
management as significant. But the effect of these particular reforms should not be 
overstated. Nor should they detract from the significant powers granted to de novo 
bodies during this period. Both the six pack and Fiscal Compact have reinforced the 
Commission’s role in EU economic surveillance. They increase the scope of EU fiscal 
surveillance, paying greater attention to expenditure and debt dynamics, and 
intensify monitoring of current account balances, housing prices, inflation differences 
and other potential drivers of macroeconomic imbalances. Financial penalties can be 
deployed under a wider range of circumstances and a new reverse majority rule 
ensures that Commission’s recommendations for corrective action under various 
stages of the excessive deficit and macroeconomic imbalance procedures take effect 
unless a qualified majority of member states disagree. The Commission may have 
‘won’ from these reforms but its victory has been modest. Its surveillance of member 
states’ economic policy has been much more detailed and intrusive but it been less 
constraining on member states than some anticipated. As of 2018, no member state 
had faced financial penalties for breaching the excessive deficit procedure and the 
Commission had showed a willingness to investigate but not prosecute member 
states for posting excessive imbalances (Hodson 2018). Member states have been 
granted significant leeway to get government borrowing under control with Jean-
Claude Juncker, in particular, making good on his promise to use the stability and 
growth pact’s flexibility (Juncker 2014: 34).  
The Commission’s involvement in the negotiation and monitoring of loans to 
eurozone members also brought a degree of intrusion into the affairs of a member 
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state not explicitly envisaged at Maastricht. Commission officials became prominent 
actors and, at times, political targets in domestic politics as they visited national 
capitals on review missions to assess fiscal plans and reform progress. To suggest 
however, as Fritz Sharpf (2011) has done, that Greece and other ‘programme 
countries’ were subject to ‘the dictates of Commission bureaucrats’ is inaccurate. The 
conditions attached to loans were not imposed on member states from the 
Berlaymont; they emerged from a process of negotiation between governments and 
their creditors. The asymmetry in such bargains should not be overlooked but nor 
should the fact that, as Michael Breen (2012: 81) puts it, ‘politicians and officials from 
the borrowing country have input into programme design and are ultimately 
responsible for implementation’. Key decisions on EU programme financing and 
loan disbursement were taken not by the Commission but by the Eurogroup, which 
in turn operated in the shadow of the Euro Summit and European Council. The 
IMF’s involvement in these arrangements further reflected the reluctance of 
Germany and other member states to delegate new powers to the Commission 
during the euro crisis (Hodson 2015b). The two pack confirmed this reluctance to 
delegate along traditional lines by involving the IMF alongside the Commission in 
reinforced surveillance for member states at risk of fiscal or financial crises. 
De novo bodies can exist inside or outside EU law but they tend to have simple, 
issue-specific mandates in contrast to the broad range of responsibilities entrusted to 
traditional Community institutions (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015a). Simple 
does not mean static (Scipioni 2018) since these bodies’ mandates can evolve over 
time. Nor are these bodies merely advisory; they can exercise significant executive or 
legislative functions that could, in principle have been delegated to the Commission, 
even if the Commission is not necessarily opposed to the empowerment of such 
institutions. A handful of de novo bodies were created in the pre-Maastricht period, 
the European Investment Bank (1958) being the first, but more than 40 have been 
created since the 1990s. The structure of these institutions is not identical; some have 
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governance structures with supranational elements, but most are essentially 
intergovernmental (see Hodson and Peterson 2017). 
Member states were altogether more willing to delegate powers to de novo bodies 
during the euro crisis because they allowed member states to formulate collective 
responses without seeking new powers for the Commission in contentious areas 
(Lequesne 2016). The creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was 
a curious exhibit in this respect, this temporary crisis fund being created in May 2010 
as a public limited company under Luxembourg law and accountable to member 
states, not as sovereigns but as shareholders. That the EFSF’s functions could have 
been delegated to the Commission can be seen from the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), a smaller fund created in May 2010 and managed 
by the Commission, which was soon superseded by the EFSF and ESM.5 Giving the 
Commission control over a crisis resolution fund, even a limited one, was simply too 
sensitive. 
The ESM, a permanent crisis fund launched in 2012, is the most important de novo 
body created during the euro crisis. The intergovernmental design of the ESM 
reflects member states’ determination to keep de novo bodies at arm’s length from 
the EU’s decision-making structures. Key decisions are taken by a Board of 
Governors composed of eurozone finance ministers and the Eurogroup president as 
its chair. The Commission is given a key role in negotiating and monitoring the 
conditions attached to ESM loans—alongside the ECB and IMF—but it attends 
meetings of the ESM Governing Council in an observer capacity only and has no say 
over ESM resources.  
New intergovernmentalism struggles to explain the empowerment of the ECB, 
argues Schmidt (2018), which has significantly expanded its mandate. But this 
argument overlooks the fact that the ECB represents one of the most consequential 
                                                   
5 The EFSM was briefly revived in 2015 to provide short-term loans to Greece but only as a 
last resort and amid considerable political controversy. 
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examples of delegation to a de novo body in the post-Maastricht period (Hodson 
2015).6 The Bank saw its responsibilities increase under European Banking Union but 
this was not an entirely straightforward act of delegation. For one thing, member 
states were determined not to confer new competences on the ECB, relying instead 
on a not uncontroversial reading of the Treaty’s provisions on financial supervision 
rather than seeking a treaty amendment (Alexander 2016: 478-9). Moreover, the 
planning and execution of these supervisory arrangements were delegated not to the 
ECB Governing Council but to a new Supervisory Board sitting within the Bank. The 
Supervisory Board includes representatives from all national supervisory authorities 
as compared with four from the ECB, making it a de novo body within a de novo 
body. Moreover, the Single Supervisory Mechanism has direct responsibility for the 
supervision of only the largest and most systemically significant banks. National 
supervisors monitor the rest as well as participating alongside ECB officials in so-
called joint supervisory teams.  
The Single Resolution Mechanism – the second pillar of European Banking Union – is 
a more conventional de novo body. Its governance structure is no more diffuse for 
this. Under proposals put forward by the Commission in July 2013, the Commission 
would have been formally responsible for deciding whether a failing bank should be 
resolved. This proposal went too far for the ECOFIN Council, which decided that the 
question of whether to resolve a bank should rest with the ECB and national 
representatives but not the Commission (see Howarth and Quaglia 2014). 
6. Magnifying Europe’s Disequilibrium 
New intergovernmentalism is much less sanguine about the state of the EU than 
some contemporary theoretical accounts of European integration. Whereas liberal 
intergovernmentalism thinks of the EU as arriving at a stable institutional 
equilibrium after Maastricht (Moravcsik 2005), new intergovernmentalism sees the 
                                                   
6 See Hodson (2015a) for a deeper discussion of the ECB as a de novo body. 
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EU as being in a persistent state of disequilibrium because of the disconnect between 
the pro-integration consensus among policy-makers and some sections of European 
society over the direction of the EU. This argument does not hearken back to some 
golden age in which the EU was in equilibrium; rather, it sees the EU, in Eastonian 
terms, as a dynamic political system that has become prone to produce dysfunctional 
policy outputs that undermine political support for European integration and cast 
doubt on the further integration of the Union (Hodson and Puetter 2018). Previous 
periods witnessed political discontent and crises over European integration, to be 
sure, but the post-Maastricht period is the first in which member states have pressed 
on with integrationist initiatives in spite of widespread public disquiet about – and 
organised opposition to – the EU. Eurosceptic parties occasionally flourished before 
1992, as in the strong showing of Denmark’s Progress Party in 1973, but they have 
only become a pervasive feature of EU politics since Maastricht (Usherwood and 
Startin 2013). That EU policy-makers have pressed ahead with European integration 
in spite of such tensions runs the risk, the new intergovernmentalism contends, that 
the EU’s political disequilibrium will unwind in a disorderly and perhaps even a 
destructive manner (Hodson and Puetter 2019).  
The euro crisis has amplified the EU’s disequilibrium by ushering in a new period of 
integration in spite of the challenge to the EU’s legitimacy and that of member state 
governments. The incremental, just-in-time nature of euro crisis reforms also fuelled 
the public impression that eurozone leaders were permanently behind the curve – a 
problem captured in Jones, Kelemen and Meunier’s (2015) idea of ‘failing forward’ – 
even if there was little public appetite for more ambitious integrationist initiatives.  
That the integrationist steps taken in response to the euro crisis – and not just the 
crisis itself – weighed on the EU’s legitimacy can be seen from the case of the AfD, a 
party created in 2013 to oppose Germany’s contribution to financial assistance 
programmes. The German government’s support for a single currency has always 
posed challenges for liberal intergovernmentalist accounts of EMU given the 
Bundesbank’s track record at securing economic stability and public attachment to 
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the deutschmark. AfD exploited the gap between political and public support in this 
member state to spectacular effect. Having campaigned to seek the dissolution of the 
euro, it became Germany’s main opposition party in the 2017 federal elections. 
Angela Merkel’s grand coalition was returned to power and although it continued to 
engage in eurozone reforms, it was a much-diminished political force.  
What an unwinding of the post-Maastricht disequilibrium might look like for the 
eurozone can be seen from Marine Le Pen’s 2017 presidential manifesto, which 
promised to restore monetary sovereignty to the French people before holding a 
referendum on the country’s membership of the EU (Le Pen 2017). It can be seen too 
in Italian Europe minister Paola Savona’s Plan B for Italy, which envisaged a 
disorderly exit from the eurozone without a referendum and default on the Banca 
d’Italia’s liabilities vis-a-vis ECB under Target2 (Gros 2018). Liberal 
intergovernmentalists are confident that such challenger parties will moderate their 
views where they win power (Moravcsik 2018: 1663) but new intergovernmentalism 
is not so sure. Italy’s League and the Five Star Movement may have backtracked on 
anti-euro statements before they entered government in 2018 but both parties remain 
critical of eurozone governance and confrontational in their dealings with EU 
institutions. The League’s talk in June 2019 of issuing mini-BOTs (low-denomination, 
non-interest-bearing treasury bills) to settle government debt, furthermore, renewed 
doubts over Italy’s long-term place in the eurozone. Comparisons between the Italian 
case and Syriza’s political journey in Greece are problematic. Alexis Tsipras’s 
commitment to euro membership meant that he was willing to endure painful 
reforms and the fracturing of his own party to win back the confidence of financial 
markets. It is unclear whether Italy’s coalition government would be willing or able 
to follow suit if the country’s sizeable public debt and fragile banks once again ignite 
concerns over Italexit. 
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7. Conclusion 
The new intergovernmentalism seeks to understand the changing dynamics of 
European integration in the post-Maastricht period. It makes no claims to be a grand 
theory of regional integration, not least as it is concerned with a specific period in the 
evolution of the EU. And yet, new intergovernmentalism defends integration 
theory’s engagement with grand ontological questions that were largely set to one 
side by the ‘governance turn’ in the 1990s and 2000s and sees commonality between 
Europe’s crisis of representation and the global trust deficit in national and 
international policy-makers. Nor does new intergovernmentalism claim a monopoly 
on understanding Europe. Indeed, it is intrinsically wary of attempts to police 
theoretical, methodological and disciplinary boundaries in EU studies (Bickerton, 
Hodson and Puetter 2015c); it is when such borders are transgressed that this field is 
at its most vibrant and relevant for wider debates in politics and international 
relations.  
Although the new intergovernmentalism emerged as a research agenda during the 
euro crisis it has been criticised for failing to account for the institutional dynamics 
set in motion by this crisis. This paper has challenged this view. The euro crisis, it has 
argued, illustrates well the problems of preference formation in the post-Maastricht 
period. The most pressing constraint on member state governments was not 
economic interest groups, which neither uniformly nor consistently supported 
preserving the eurozone in its current form, but the problems of legitimacy facing the 
EU and its member governments. Governments remained loyal to the euro in spite of 
the short-term temptations facing some member states to restore national currencies 
and sought to circumvent problems of legitimacy by avoiding the transfer of new 
competences to the Commission. Although the Commission saw its involvement in 
EU economic and fiscal surveillance deepen as a result of the euro crisis, it was the 
ECB and other de novo bodies that were the real institutional winners from the crisis, 
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alongside the European Council and newly created Euro Summit. Moreover, heads 
of state or government reached agreement on these reforms and crisis resolution 
measures not simply through hard bargaining but via a process of consensus-seeking 
and deliberation that privileged cooperative solutions to the crisis and helped to 
bridge ideational differences that this period of turmoil for the single currency 
exposed. Although such efforts helped to save the single currency, they deepened the 
political disequilibrium facing the EU. 
A question posed by this analysis is not whether the euro crisis is a painful case for 
new intergovernmentalism but whether it might actually be a convenient one. The 
high-stakes surrounding this crisis, the technocratic character of this policy domain 
and the scope for institutional innovation may, in other words, have been well suited 
to the intergovernmental working methods highlighted by this approach. On the face 
of it, other major crises to confront the EU reveal dynamics over the last decade 
speak to key claims of the new intergovernmentalism. Far from offering a ‘deliberate, 
legitimate and functional response’ to the European refugee crisis (Moravcsik 2018: 
1669), member states such as Hungary pushed back against the Commission’s 
refugee quotas for reasons that had less to do with commercial interests than 
contestation over European integration. Although the European Council eventually 
reached a consensus on how to handle the crisis, its European migration agenda 
inflamed those who criticised the EU for being too brutal in protecting Europe’s 
borders as well as those who saw it as being too lax. As regards Brexit, David 
Cameron’s failure to win popular support for the UK’s continued membership of the 
EU in spite of strong support from key economic interest groups laid bare the 
problems of preference formation in the post-Maastricht period. His successor, 
Theresa May’s, failure to strike a workable withdrawal agreement with the EU-27, 
moreover, offered a stark demonstration of what happens when a member state 
abruptly detaches itself from the European Council’s deliberative and consensus-
seeking norms.  
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